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Unemployment Revisited in Comparative Perspective:
Labour Market Policy in Strasbourg and Liverpool,
1890–1914
Noel White s id e
Summary: Many historical studies, some of them comparative, have explored the
foundations of welfare states and the birth of unemployment policies in Europe in
the late nineteenth century. Nearly all have focused on political debate at national
level. This paper bases its analysis on labour market reforms initiated in Strasbourg
and Liverpool in the decades preceding World War I. It explores how bona fide
unemployed workers, the proper clients of official help, were distinguished from
the mass of the poor and indigent. The labour market had to be defined and
organized before policies for the unemployed could be put in place. The object is to
demonstrate not only how this was done, but also how different perceptions of
social justice and economic efficiency influenced both the process and the outcomes
of public interventions, in this instance undermining attempts to transfer specific
policies from one country to another.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Historical studies have demonstrated how the rise of the ‘‘social question’’
in the late nineteenth century stimulated extensive debate in major
European economies about its nature, initiating new approaches to the
categorization of indigent populations.1 The division between the
 Research for this paper was funded by the European Commission under EUROCAP
(Framework 5). I acknowledge the help from my colleagues Benedicte Zimmermann and Simon
Constantine for providing material and to them, Stuart Macdonald and Daniel Clegg for
comments on earlier texts. Thanks are also due to three anonymous referees, in particular a
French commentator for very helpful and detailed suggestions; also to Professor Peter Hennock
for constructive comment and for access to the typescript of his forthcoming book, The Origins
of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany, 1850–1914 (Cambridge, forthcoming).
Responsibility for all opinions expressed here, however, remains mine alone.
1. See in particular A. Desrosie`res, The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical
Reasoning (Cambridge [etc.], 1998); C. Topolov, Naissance du chomeur, 1880–1914 (Paris,
1994); M. Mansfield, R. Salais, and N. Whiteside (eds), Aux sources du chomage, 1880–1914:
une comparison interdisciplinaire entre la France et la Grande Bretagne (Paris, 1994);
B. Zimmermann, C. Didry, and P. Wagner (eds), Le travail et la nation: histoire croise´e de la
IRSH 52 (2007), pp. 35–56 DOI: 10.1017/S002085900600277x
# 2007 Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis
deserving and undeserving poor, the object of philanthropic and official
attention in earlier years, was replaced by new languages of social
classification, based on the relationship between individuals and the
labour market, and the ostensible reason why an adequate income was not
earned. These distinctions, endowed with the status of social facts,
emerged as proper objects for new policy initiatives.2 International
exchange of information fostered the spread of such practices, employing
common identifications of social risk (unemployment, sickness, disability,
infirmity, and old age) that have remained in use ever since. Each country,
through census and survey, sought to apprehend numerical dimensions of
these new categories (which were defined and identified in very different
ways). As the term ‘‘unemployment’’ entered common parlance, policy
aimed to distinguish its victims as an industrial problem separate from
other causes of social indigence and to afford them separate treatment.3
The organization of the labour market became a major political concern;
however, the avenues of intervention through which public authorities
sought to promote reform varied widely. What criteria should be used to
distinguish the unemployed from the economically inactive, from the
itinerant beggar or layabout, and from the sick and aged? Did those laid off
during the slack season require different treatment to those threatened by
permanent joblessness? Answers to such questions proved highly con-
tentious, provoked extensive debate, and varied by place and by occupation
as well as between nation states. In an era of economic transformation,
growing urbanization, and changing technologies, labour market problems
became lodged within political debate in various ways. In other words,
why unemployment was a problem and how official agencies might
alleviate it translated into very different typologies of political discussion.
This paper seeks to clarify this variance in the unemployment debate, first,
by outlining the broad political parameters that shaped how the issue was
viewed at national level and second, by looking at the actual implementation
of new policy initiatives ‘‘on the ground’’ at municipal level. The focus is on
three major European economies – France, Great Britain, and Germany: on
how unemployment was viewed in political terms and the role national
government sought to play in its amelioration. Attention is then given to
policy developments in two cities: Liverpool and Strasbourg. Although
economically different, there are reasons for this choice: these cities not only
pioneered new systems of labour market organization but also adopted
similar methods for doing so that generated rather different outcomes. Both
were the focus of national reforming initiatives.
The transfer of Strasbourg from France to Germany in 1871 generated a
France et de l’Allegmagne (Paris, 1999).
2. Topolov, Naissance du chomeur, ch. 13.
3. See, for example, W.H. Beveridge, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry (London, 1909).
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programme of urban modernization, driven from Berlin and designed to
win the allegiance of a newly acquired population by demonstrating the
benefits of German rule. At the cutting edge of labour market policy,
Strasbourg emerged as something of a paradigm. Detailed evidence was
presented to the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws in Britain
documenting the advantages of both German labour registries in general
and the Strasbourg system in particular as solutions to Britain’s labour
market problems.4 With the emergence of a national scheme of labour
exchanges in the UK in 1908, it is clear that such evidence had a marked
impact on British unemployment policy. In the UK, the issue of labour
market reform had been largely informed by problems encountered in
London, specifically the problem of casual labour endemic to a major
commercial and trading centre.5 This encouraged an experiment in
Liverpool, second only to London as a global port, designed to de-
casualize the labour market and using instruments drawn from German
precedent for the purpose: an example of direct policy transfer that had,
however, disappointing results
This initiative allows us to compare similar policies with similar
objectives in different settings, revealing the different assumptions on
which policy was based. Neither city can serve as a proxy for their
respective nation states: on the contrary, both existed at the borders of
national communities and contained multi-national populations of differ-
ent religious and cultural background. Yet different perceptions of how
economic efficiency and social justice might be reconciled and the role
public powers should play in this reconciliation created very different
outcomes in the cities involved. In this sense, the analysis is illustrative
rather than anything more. Yet by drawing attention away from
unemployment as a side product of economic trade cycles or fluctuating
labour demand and towards the political framework within which the
problem was interpreted, this paper highlights how collective assumptions
about the common good shaped responses to similar policy initiatives and
determined their success. The relevance of the study thus stretches beyond
these cities and this historical period.
In the late nineteenth century, unemployment formed only one part of
the ‘‘social question’’; the demands of an increasingly vociferous working-
4. See evidence presented by William Beveridge and R.H. Tawney to the Royal Commission on
the Poor Laws, Minutes of Evidence, VIII, Parliamentary Papers [hereafter PP], Cmd 5066/1908,
pp. 35–61; Minutes [:::], IX, PP, Cmd 5068/1910, pp. 329–348.
5. For the work of Charles Booth and William Beveridge on casualism in London as central to
the unemployment question, see G.A. Phillips and N. Whiteside, Casual Labour: The
Unemployment Question in the Port Transport Industry 1880–1970 (Oxford, 1986), chs 2 and
3. Also Beveridge, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry. It is surprising, in contrast, how little
attention was paid to industrial unemployment; trade-union figures were adapted with some
modification but no independent investigation.
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class movement needed to be met while sustaining constitutional stability
and social order. Here the experience of continental Europe differed from
that of Britain, where the slower pace of industrialization and the
longevity of established constitutional arrangements made this dimension
less pressing. In both France and Germany, as the following section
emphasizes, the determination of legitimate political authority and the
scope of its jurisdiction were more open questions. To substantiate the
rather different policy frameworks within which the unemployed were
viewed, the next section outlines briefly the different ways the social
question was constructed within France, Germany, and Britain in the late
nineteenth century. The subsequent section describes the Strasbourg
labour market reforms and the adoption of the Liverpool Dock Scheme of
1911. The final section offers an analysis of the comparative performance
of an apparently similar programme of reform in these cities and offers
some conclusions.
I D E N T I F Y I N G T H E U N E M P L O Y E D : P O L I C Y
P E R S P E C T I V E S I N F R A N C E , G E R M A N Y , A N D B R I T A I N
The process of fabricating uniform classifications of social dependency
proved complex, often contradictory, and ultimately inconclusive. In
France, the 1896 census identified the ‘‘unemployed’’ as those whose
situation was attributable to an unexpected rupture of a permanent
employment contract. Evidence of dependence on a single employer
reflected a construction of unemployment in terms of an established
occupation. Here, paradoxically, permanent subordination to a single
employer was to be the foundation of the worker’s liberty as this endowed
him with legally guaranteed social rights.6 Predictable loss of waged work
(due to regular slack seasons, to be met by personal savings or collective
pre´voyance) was distinguished from unforeseeable job loss that provoked
domestic crisis. Those working for an employer by sub-contract (whose
obligations were defined by the task to be completed) were not necessarily
‘‘unemployed’’ when that contract ended. This juridical definition was
extremely narrow.
Local experience and perception of labour market problems proved
more varied. Some municipalities subsidized local charitable endeavour
(bureaux de bienfaisance), where distinguishing the ‘‘real’’ unemployed
depended on the client’s acceptance of an offer of work from a benevolent
employer or on municipal public works, allowing the rest to be directed to
depots de mendacite´. Another construction can be observed in the
operation of the bourses de travail, run by local trade unions, which
essentially acted as placement agencies for unemployed members. Political
6. R. Salais, ‘‘Introduction’’, p. 17, in Mansfield et al., Aux sources du chomage.
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initiatives to convert revolutionary syndicalism into republican virtue
encouraged the creation of the urban bourses, to allow trade unions to
organize local labour markets: to place suitable men in suitable jobs that
guaranteed union terms. Here, unemployment is cast within the locality
and the trade: the status of the skilled man is respected in terms of the work
he is offered. In official eyes, keeping local men in local jobs discouraged
drift into major urban centres where those desperate for work might
undercut native labour and provoke unrest. Here, political factors
dominate how unemployment is understood and treated.
Voluntary unemployment insurance was officially well regarded in
France (receiving both municipal and national subsidies from 1905), but
was hardly widespread.7 French trade unionists opposed the idea that
workers should pool hard-earned savings to prop up capitalism; outside
the print industries, trade-union benefit funds hardly existed.8 In 1902, a
survey revealed that only 30,297 union members could receive protection
from their organization when unemployed – and over 10,000 of these
belonged to the Federation du Livre alone.9 The unpopularity of
contributory social insurance reflected its strong association with
authoritarian regimes, with the policies of Napoleon III as well as those
of Bismarck, reinforced by an association with a German enemy. This
encouraged republicans to promote alternative remedies. The general
preference was for local assistance in needy cases; from 1905, those
destitute due to old age, invalidity, or insufficient income for a large family
could turn to municipal assistance; cases were judged on their merits.10
Municipal funds for the unemployed, with national subsidies, were set up
from 1914 and were extended in the interwar years; localities thus
determined the remit of unemployment while also offering the only
realistic support for the vast majority of the workless.
In Imperial Germany, a national definition of unemployment was
addressed in the 1895 census. Unlike the French criteria, which employed
juridical means to distinguish the unemployed, the imperial statistical
office focused on the individual’s general economic dependence on waged
work, covering all workers: out-workers, sub-contractors, as well as the
permanently employed. Unemployment reflected an economic situation: a
deprivation of the means of subsistence – a definition whose origins reflect
7. Paris, Lyon, Limoges, Dijon, and Moulins were the exceptional cases; some de´partements also
adopted the practice. I thank an anonymous French referee for this information.
8. M. Dreyfus, S. Kott, M. Pigenet, and N. Whiteside ‘‘Les bases multiples du syndicalisme’’, in
F. Boll, A. Prost, and J-L. Robert, L’invention des syndicalismes: le syndicalisme en Europe
occidentale a` la fin du XIXie`me sie`cle (Paris, 1997), pp. 269–285.
9. M. Pigenet, ‘‘Mouvement syndical francais: prestations et services’’, Cahiers d’histoire de
l’Institut de recherches marxistes, 51 (1993), p. 13.
10. D. Renard, ‘‘The Relations between Assistance and Insurance in the Constitution of the
French Welfare System’’, in MIRE, Rencontres et Recherches, Comparing Social Welfare
Systems in Europe, I, The Oxford Conference (Paris, 1994), pp. 93–115.
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the analysis of Marx and Engels during the mid-century economic
depression. In Germany in particular, the early introduction of the
sickness insurance laws served to identify the boundaries of the labour
market. The unemployed were thus threatened not only by the loss of
professional identity and material deprivation, but also (in modern
terminology) with social exclusion: the consequence of lost rights to both
health insurance benefits and representation on health fund governance.
Rights to insurance benefits identified workers from the mass of the
indigent, the latter being subject to intrusive poor law appraisal that
determined their subsequent treatment. Unemployment, in a German
context, thus translated into lost social rights as well as wages.11 The
imperial government in Berlin resisted sporadic demands from the socialist
movement for national solutions to labour market problems. Reform was
left, in constitutional and practical terms, to municipal action. In many
municipalities, political representation was skewed in favour of higher tax
payers; urban elites in industrialized areas were as disinclined to respond to
the demands of social democracy as the imperial state.
Labour market policy in imperial Germany was determined by
municipalities: part of a fast-expanding range of obligations that, in the
context of phenomenal urban growth, included all types of service
provision from street lighting and sanitation to public transport. The
process of widening the orbit of municipal power shifted authority away
from traditional elites: a new class of professional administrators emerged:
lawyers, accountants, and, above all, statisticians. In Strasbourg in
particular (whose reforms are addressed below) young professional
German reformers were eager to transform territory newly acquired by
the Reich into a model community,12 integrating the population into the
recently established Kaiserreich and promoting social harmony by
incorporating trade unionists into the management of social affairs. In
other urban centres, such cooperative arrangements were not automati-
cally forthcoming. A restricted franchise and class conflict rendered liberal
reform less attractive and, outside some urban centres such as Frankfurt,
Stuttgart, and Dusseldorf, representation of the Sozialistische Partei
Deutschlands (SPD) was weaker and measures adopted to address labour
market problems could be more repressive.
Even so, the spread of measures specifically for the unemployed (public
works: labour exchanges and eventually municipal subsidies for trade-
union unemployment funds) indicates how urban authorities in general
recognized the unemployed as a class separate from the poor and
11. B. Zimmermann, ‘‘Deux modes de construction statistique du chomage au tournant du
sie`cle’’, in Zimmermann et al., Le travail et la nation, p. 260.
12. B. Zimmermann, ‘‘La constitution du chomage en Allemagne’’ (the`se doctoral, IEP, 1995),
pp 198–204. This paper refers to the thesis, now published as La constitution du chomage en
Allemagne: entre professions et territoires (Paris, 2001).
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developed policies designed specifically for this category. In the industrial
areas of the Ruhr, Berlin, and Saxony, however, cooperation was less
evident: the separate agencies set up by employers, trade unions, and
municipalities illustrate how labour market control was contested where
industrial conflict was more common. Local politics shaped the nature of
local labour market policy, generating a range of initiatives that reflected
the nature and extent of trade union organization as well as the degree of
industrial conflict found in specific urban communities.13
In Britain and imperial Germany, trade unions recruiting mostly skilled
workers offered help (in the form of placement and benefits) to paid up
members out of work14: The question of unemployment and its manage-
ment was here located within union systems of trade regulation and
control, reinforcing union organizational discipline. Union benefits
prevented members from being forced to take work on non-union terms;
branches acted as placement agencies and guaranteed the skills of the men
concerned. Members were supported for refusing work that failed to pay
the union rate and were fined for accepting such work. Union benefit
schemes regulated work practices and sustained membership. In Britain,
seniority frequently translated into higher benefit rates or extended rights.
In both countries, access to social protection from a trade-based organi-
zation was infinitely more attractive than being subject to interrogation by
the poor law authorities. Also in both countries, and unlike France, the
tradition of the unemployed moving from place to place in search of work
– and receiving union support while on the road – was well established.15
Numbers covered expanded steadily in the decades preceding World War
I, particularly in Germany. In 1905, the German imperial statistical office
claimed that over 1 million workers could claim union benefits when
unemployed.16 In Britain slightly lower numbers claimed better benefits
for longer periods than their German counterparts17 – although we must
recall that the German population at that time was nearly twice the size of
the British.18
13. G. Steinmetz, Regulating the Social: The Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial
Germany (Princeton, NJ, 1993), pp. 203–213.
14. See, Zimmermann, ‘‘La constitution du chomage en Allemagne’’, pp. 169–175; for British
trade-union systems, N. Whiteside, ‘‘Definir le chomage’’, in Mansfield et al, Aux sources du
chomage, pp. 381–412.
15. R.A. Leeson, Travelling Brothers: The Six Centuries’ Road from Craft Fellowship to Trade
Unionism (London, 1979); also R.H. Southall, ‘‘Regional Unemployment Patterns among Skilled
Engineers in Britain, 1851–1914’’, Journal of Historical Geography, 12 (1986), pp. 268–286.
16. Report (late 1905) on file LAB 2/1564/CL&SL 897, National Archive [hereafter NA], Kew,
London.
17. Schloss: memorandum on comparison of UK and German unemployment statistics,
October 1905: on file LAB 2/1564/CL&SL 1216/05, NA.
18. The German population was c.64.5 million and the British 36 million. I am grateful to
Professor Hennock for pointing this out.
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Trade-union provision of social protection was officially well re-
garded,19 but the association with industrial dispute was not. Major
employers in heavy industry in the Ruhr or on the Clyde looked askance at
any measure designed to promote union membership by the extension of
state subsidies to union funds.20 Led by Strasbourg and Frankfurt, some
fifteen German cities had adopted the Ghent system by 1914 (so named
after the town that initiated the policy in 1901) of offering municipal
subsidies to union benefit funds. Frankfurt also created a contributory
municipal fund for non-unionists seeking protection.21 Local subvention
of voluntary unemployment insurance was more widespread in Belgium
and the Netherlands but remained unknown in Britain. Its adoption
reflects official aims to recalibrate trade-union systems of classification, to
distinguish those unemployed due to circumstances beyond their control
from those involved in industrial conflict. In Britain at least, debates on a
national scheme for the unemployed addressed this problem more directly,
provoking dissent within the union movement and opposition to state
intervention as a result.22
In Britain, the early twentieth century witnessed a reversal of liberal
tradition, to create a national unemployment policy. Official and unofficial
investigation had revealed how poverty damaged industrial efficiency and
accelerated economic (and imperial) decline. Pauperism was a drain on the
resources of inner cities where poor law authorities were increasingly
forced to rely on loans from the Exchequer rather than raise local taxation.
Such practices excited official concern and stimulated social reform.23 The
situation appeared almost perverse. Statistics showed that wages were
rising in the late nineteenth century, yet social unrest in major conurba-
tions during economic recessions indicated an apparent failure by the poor
to save and the damage done by intermittent, casual (‘‘precarious’’)
employment in major commercial centres, notably on the docks.24 Moral
19. See, for example, reports of Royal Commission on Labour (1892) and the Royal
Commission on the Poor Laws (1908–1909).
20. ‘‘How do you know it (union unemployment benefit) is not being paid to men who should
not be paid it? The question comes up then. What is a strike? What is a trade dispute? Do you
know? I do not know. I maintain that a particular man is out on a trade dispute and the union say
he is not, but he is out of employment and they use my money to help him.’’ Henderson,
Shipbuilding Employers Federation deputation to the Board of Trade, 14 June 1911, p. 56; MSS
237/B/1/144: Modern Record Centre (MRC) Warwick.
21. A. Faust, ‘‘State and Unemployment in Germany, 1880–1914’’, in W. Mommsen (ed.) The
Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany 1850–1950 (London, 1983), p. 159. See
also Hennock, The Origins of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany, ch. 17, ‘‘Germany’’ for
details of the various towns involved.
22. N. Whiteside, ‘‘Welfare Legislation and the Unions during the First World War’’, Historical
Journal, 23 (1980), pp. 857–874.
23. J. Harris, Unemployment and Politics: A Study in English Social Policy (Oxford, 1972).
24. H. Barkai, ‘‘Travail, emploi et salaires dans l’economie neoclassique: les conceptions
marshalliennes au tournant du sie`cle’’, in Mansfield et al., Aux sources du chomage, pp.153–183.
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imperative allied to fears for Britain’s economic future: workers must be
taught to manage their lives – to work regularly, to invest in skills, and to
save against the risk of job loss, illness, and declining earning power in old
age.
This agenda and the political strategies it promoted identified the
unemployed as that part of the pauper host capable of self-protection,
whose work habits and skills were essential to future prosperity. Like its
German counterpart, British unemployment presented a strong economic
identity. However, this was a national response to what was perceived as a
national crisis, involving more normative definitions of the problem and
how it should be cured. Attention focused on the relationship between
chronic poverty, physical incapacity, and irregular (or casual) employment
as causes of pauperism. A national problem was calibrated in social
scientific terms: impartial enquiry would reveal the analysis and profes-
sional expertise would stipulate the cure. A logic of rationalization, based
on a normative definition of the working week, underpinned policy
development. The provision of municipal or charitable help was criticized
as sustaining irregular working habits: this countermanded the programme
of decasualization on which the government embarked.
To avoid the punitive poor law, those desperate for work crowded the
casual labour markets: major ports, urban building sites, gasworks and so
on, where the heavy nature of the work, the competition for jobs and daily
fluctuations in the demand for labour rendered job security impossible.25
Casual labour markets were deemed inefficient. They sustained large
numbers incapable of regular work and fostered social and moral
degeneration (poverty bred criminality, sickness, and incapacity), thus
threatening Britain’s industrial (and imperial) pre-eminence.
[:::] casual labourers are almost inevitably demoralized by their circumstances.
Irregular work and earnings make for irregular habits; conditions of employment
in which a man stands to gain or lose so little by his good or bad behaviour make
for irresponsibility, laziness, insubordination. [:::] The line between indepen-
dence and dependence, between the efficient and the unemployable, must be
made clearer. Every place in ‘‘free’’ industry, carrying with it the rights of
citizenship – civil liberty, fatherhood, conduct of one’s own life and government
of a family – should be a ‘‘whole’’ place involving full employment and earnings
up to a definite minimum.26
Under-employment bred unemployability: if treated like a pauper, the
unemployed regular man would eventually end up as another casual
labourer incapable of holding down a permanent job and blurring the lines
between the active worker and the pauper host. To break this cycle,
reformers argued, required the regular man’s protection; his treatment
25. See Phillips and Whiteside, Casual Labour, ch. 1.
26. W.H. Beveridge, ‘‘The Problem of the Unemployed’’, Sociological Papers, 1907, pp. 326–327.
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must distinguish him from the pauper, the habitual casual, the vagrant, the
drunkard, and the petty criminal: the sources of the British dimension of
the ‘‘social question’’. The solution to labour market reform lay in the
introduction of labour exchanges, which would remove the inefficient, the
idle, the vagrant, and habitually irregular, and concentrate work in the
hands of the most efficient, thereby containing pauperism while improving
economic performance. Far from seeking to destroy the problem of
unemployment, therefore, policy was designed to create it.27
This logic underpinned the well-known reform programme introduced
by Liberal governments in Britain: specifically, the Labour Exchanges Act
(1908), the National Insurance Act (1911), and the introduction of old-age
pensions (1908). Unlike their municipal counterparts in continental
Europe, labour exchanges in Britain offered a national network, designed
to promote total labour mobility between as well as within different
professions and towns. New information technologies (the telephone)
facilitated the immediate exchange of information about vacancies and
applicants; state officials would send the most efficient to where their
services were needed. Networks of official surveillance would allow the
easy identification of applicants of good character, skill, and sound
working habits, in whose capable hands all available work should be
concentrated, facilitating the elimination of the less efficient and promot-
ing industrial prosperity while guaranteeing good service to employers
seeking workers.28
Contributory National Insurance (1911) reinforced this strategy. It was
in the employer’s interest to avoid hiring day labourers: each required a
weekly contribution for health insurance purposes, a payment that was
doubled if the worker was also a member of the unemployment scheme.29
Access to unemployment benefit, based on actuarial calculation, would
separate the regular contributor from the rest (the ‘‘morality of mathe-
matics’’, according to the young Winston Churchill). A stipulated annual
number of contributions and benefits limited to fifteen weeks maximum
each year identified unemployed claimants as temporarily jobless in
previously regular employment. Long-term unemployment was not
officially recognized: once benefit rights were exhausted, the claimant left
the scheme and re-entered the pauper class. From the small print found in
the legislation, the British unemployed emerge: a select group of regularly
employed men whose services were temporarily surplus to immediate
27. M. Mansfield, ‘‘Naissance d’une definition institutionnelle du chomage en Grande
Bretagne’’, in Mansfield et al., Aux sources du chomage, pp. 281–295.
28. Ibid.
29. Part II of the 1911 National Insurance Act offered unemployment insurance that covered a
restricted number of trades – largely those with skilled unions offering unemployment benefits,
i.e. shipbuilding, engineering, construction, and metalworking. The Act was extended to all
manual workers earning less than £250 p.a. in 1920.
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requirements, in a scheme initially confined to trades known to suffer from
seasonal fluctuations in demand.
O R G A N I Z I N G L A B O U R M A R K E T S : S T R A S B O U R G A N D
L I V E R P O O L
Strasbourg
The transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to German rule in 1871 required the
integration of a new population into the Kaiserreich. This provincial
economy was centred on village-based small factories (well over 2,000 by
the 1880s) each traditionally run virtually as a personal fiefdom.
Paternalism dominated industrial relations: manufacture was largely
organized under family labour; typically the father supervised the work
of his wife and adult offspring. Following transfer into the Kaiserreich, the
introduction of labour legislation modified traditional social relations. On
the one hand, thanks to the employer-dominated factory sickness fund
becoming registered under the German social insurance scheme and
acquiring official recognition, new systems appeared to dovetail neatly
with the old. On the other, local employers resented the introduction of a
German labour inspectorate more dedicated to the imposition of technical
standards than to preserving traditions of Catholic paternalism. The
appearance of new social legislation required that labour be given a voice in
matters previously considered the sole province of managerial prerogative.
As Sandrine Kott has shown, the transfer of sovereignty was thus
accompanied by a transformation in social relations, as German authorities
helped to foster workplace organization and a more cohesive labour
movement, also giving women workers a voice in the workplace for the
first time.30
During this period, Strasbourg underwent its own transformation.31
Under the French Second Empire, Strasbourg’s commercial significance
had diminished as its military importance grew; the city turned its back on
the Rhine, the source of its original commercial pre-eminence, becoming
increasingly fortified against possible German military aggression. In this
period, a local council reluctant to pay for them resisted imperial projects
of Hausmannization and general urban improvement. While Parisian
finance and Parisian-based railway companies linked this provincial centre
to the capital, its substructure languished in desuetude. The city’s economy
centred on local commerce, transforming local products for regional
30. Sandrine Kott, L’E´tat social allemand: repre´sentations et pratiques (Paris, 1995), esp. chs 3, 5,
and 6.
31. Information on Strasbourg is drawn from Hennock, The Origins of the Welfare State in
Britain and Germany, ch. 17. Also see evidence of R.H. Tawney to the R.C. on the Poor Laws,
cited in n. 4 above.
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consumption. The tanneries, breweries, and food processing industries
dumped their waste, together with the population’s effluent, into networks
of canals and rivulets permeating the city. In short, this was a fortified,
unhygienic regional backwater. The transfer to German rule changed the
city’s profile entirely. The town was garrisoned and ramparts recon-
structed to face the other way. New suburbs were built. Under the expert
eyes of trained sanitary engineers, water-born piped sanitation replaced
the antique system of wells, canals and public drains that had characterized
the old town.32 Technical experts appointed by Berlin supervised reform.33
The municipality expanded exponentially; inward migration from all over
Europe (notably Italy) and an influx of new inhabitants from other
German states (including a military garrison of some 15,500 by 1913)
swelled the population. In 1875, Strasbourg had had 80,000 inhabitants,
both within and without the city walls. By 1900 this had reached 151,000
and by 1910 179,000, including some 4,600 foreigners (non-German) and
61,000 Germans from outside Alsace-Lorraine.34 This German population
expected better living standards and public service. The desire of imperial
authority to win hearts and minds through the promotion of urban
improvement was reflected in the political demands of the growing
numbers of new inhabitants, who sustained the reforming initiative when
direct rule from Berlin ended and local democracy was restored.
The strategy of social improvement embraced the proper organization
of the labour market, swollen by the influx of construction workers and
general labourers seeking work on these new programmes of fortification,
sanitation, and urban expansion. As essentially a commercial and
administrative centre, most inhabitants worked in commerce and trans-
port. In addition to the military garrison, the city also possessed a sizeable
professional middle class.35 However, in comparison with other German
cities, Strasbourg also contained more than its fair share of poverty – and
the elimination of this (or at least its containment) was also a cause of
official concern. The process of labour market reform was initiated in the
late nineteenth century, following a pronounced economic downturn
(1892–1894). Strasbourg was among the first municipal authorities in
Germany to initiate such a programme and, by the early twentieth century,
was the first city to integrate a scheme of unemployment insurance within
a complex official agenda integrating poor relief, labour registries, and
education into a single system. Administration was vested in the
democratically elected municipal council; the left-liberal Demokratische
32. Vivienne Claude, ‘‘Strasbourg 1850–1914: assainissement et politiques urbaines’’ (the`se
doctorale, EHESS), 1985.
33. Zimmermann, ‘‘La constitution du chomage en Allemagne’’, ch. 6.
34. Census figures taken from K. Eichelmann, Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Strassburg [:::] fu¨r
die Zeit vom 1 April 1900 bis 31 Ma¨rz 1910 (Strasbourg, 1916), p. 3.
35. Ibid., p. 13.
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Volkspartei, founded in Alsace in the 1890s, was a crucial political
component in the promotion of reform.36 By the early twentieth century,
Strasbourg had become something of a paradigm, thanks to its integrated
system of managing the search for work.
A central labour bureau was created in 1894 (coordinating established
trade-union registries) and a municipal labour office in 1900, both
managed by a joint committee elected by employers and employed. All
itinerant workers entering the city were obliged to register with this office,
which gradually extended its remit over the following decade to embrace a
growing number of trades. It coordinated policies to rationalize the
distribution of work with the work of local poor law authorities that,
similar to the system found in Elberfeld, organized teams of volunteers to
visit the destitute and to arrange relief appropriate to their circumstances.
Eventually the labour office developed as a call centre for a network of
telephone-linked labour exchanges extending across Alsace-Lorraine.
Local management of the national railways subsidized workers going to
placements (covering some 1,700 workers annually by 1910). All
subcontractors recruiting labour on municipal projects were obliged to
hire through the exchange and to respect a minimum wage; city authorities
introduced road construction, forestry, and similar public works schemes
during slack seasons to absorb idle labour. From 1907, the exchanges
placed business and clerical employees and, from 1909, they took over
responsibility for placing the ‘‘work-shy’’ and semi-invalid from the poor
law authorities. The exchange became pivotal to the classification of the
able-bodied indigent and determined their treatment: reference of the
drunk and mendicant to the police, penal work under the poor law for
the deliberately idle, public works for general labourers in the slack season,
placement with an employer for regular men. In the year 1912–1913, the
20 labour exchanges affected 54,000 placements, divided roughly equally
between skilled and unskilled jobs – thereby demonstrating that the
system did not simply operate on the margins of the labour market, but
was central to recruitment in all forms of employment.37
From 1902, the municipality also undertook the placement of appren-
tices. All school leavers, following medical inspection and discussion
between pupil, teacher, and parents, filed a card at the exchange containing
details of achievements and desired training. Master artisans were obliged
to advertise apprenticeships through the exchange; exchange officials sent
appropriate school-leavers to fill each vacancy. From 1906, a small official
subsidy enabled apprenticeships to be offered to the sons of poor families.
36. Hennock, The Origins of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany, ch. 17.
37. E. Friedrich, ‘‘Der Ausbau der Arbeitsamster in Elsass-Lothringen’’, 3 January 1914,
Armenrecht (Elsass), Straßburger Blatter fu¨r Sozialpolitik u. Armenwesen, 1913/14–1918, ZC
2735, Leipzig University Library.
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Poor relief was reformed in 1906 to play a more active role in labour
market organization; voluntary assessment followed up the initial
judgement of the exchanges, to determine relief and treatment. By 1914,
the city was allocating land as allotments for pauper claimants to work in
return for relief.38 Investigation in 1911, however, revealed that rural and
small-town poor relief in Alsace-Lorraine still catered for about 12,000
itinerant poor, mostly men aged twenty to forty capable of work (although
not necessarily eager to do it) whose situation was missed by the
exchanges.39 Whether or not such claimants belonged to the labour
market, and were therefore proper clients for the exchanges, was a
controversial point.
In addition to contacts with local schools and the poor law, the exchange
system also sustained very close links with a growing trade-union
movement – particularly after 1899, when the local SPD endorsed the
system. Reformist free-trade-unionists associated with the SPD, like their
Christian counterparts, sought to restrict job opportunities to their
members, creating registries as placement agencies that were eventually
absorbed by the municipal labour bureau to form part of its network.
These unions also developed schemes of unemployment benefits to
support members out of work. Both forms of trade-union organization
agitated for the introduction of the Ghent system of municipal subven-
tions for union unemployment schemes. At a meeting of the Senate in
Strasbourg in December 1906, the idea was adopted and 5,000 marks were
set aside to subsidize benefits paid by ‘‘workers’ societies’’, starting from
January 1907.40 This necessitated a reappraisal of the meaning of
unemployment. The labour office refused the municipal ‘‘top-up’’ to
claimants on strike, ill, or dismissed for misconduct. Even so, ‘‘the
significance of the labour office involvement lies in its assessment of the
cause of unemployment, the scale and type of unemployment and its
capacity to distribute new work to end unemployment’’.41 Municipal
willingness to offer support for those unemployed due to an industrial
dispute was decided on a case-by-case basis. From their inception, joint
committees that managed the exchanges included union representatives;
municipally subsidized schemes of voluntary unemployment insurance,
spreading rapidly in this period, remained under union control.
This comprehensive scheme of labour market management rapidly
attracted the attention of reformers from other countries. In his evidence
to the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, William Beveridge praised
the German labour exchanges; here were mechanisms to rationalize the
38. Eichelmann, Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Strassburg, p. 331 and pp. 379–385.
39. Dr Graf zu Solms-Rodelheim, ‘‘Die Hilfsbedu¨rftigen Wanderer und ihre Wege in Elsass-
Lothringen’’, Straßburger Blatter fu¨r Sozialpolitik u. Armenwesen.
40. Eichelmann, Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Strassburg, p. 836.
41. Ibid.
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distribution of work. R.H. Tawney, at the time a young research assistant
attached to the University of Glasgow, offered a detailed description of the
Strasbourg system to the Commission, as a means to counteract and
control the growing incidence of casualism in his home city, another
British port.42 In Britain, the central issue was the decasualization of the
labour market: in London and Liverpool the problems of casualism and
endemic pauperism appeared at their most severe.
Liverpool43
Liverpool was, after London, the second largest port in the world in 1900.44
Serving the hinterland of industrial Lancashire, the city focused totally on
trade and commerce: in the development of shipping and insurance services,
in shipbuilding and ship-repair (centred on Birkenhead), and overwhel-
mingly in the handling, storage, and distribution of cargo. Aside from white-
collar insurance clerks and the engineers serving the shipbuilding trade, the
labour force was unskilled. Manufacturing industry was conspicuously
absent; port transport and associated occupations dominated the employ-
ment offered by the city. The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board managed
the docks at the centre and south end, where master stevedores and master
porters subcontracted cargo handling from short-sea traders, merchants,
and smaller shipping lines. The growing size of steamers (particularly for the
passenger trade) fostered the development of new docks at the north end,
where major shipowners employed a larger proportion of permanent hands
and loaded and discharged their own vessels.45 Dock charges combined with
tidal change put pressure on subcontractors and workers alike. It was
commonplace for gangs to work a ship round the clock for two or even three
days, to clear the port in the shortest possible time. High hourly wage rates
rewarded physically demanding work and attracted onto the waterfront the
cast-offs from other trades: any labourer seeking a job, not only from
Liverpool, but from other industrial towns and particularly from Ireland.
Irish dockers dominated the south end and sectarian difference perpetuated
divisions within the dock population.
A disorganized labour market and marked fluctuations in the daily
demand for labour created crowds around the dock gates disproportionate
to the port’s requirements. The first attempts to control this influx in 1890
came not from employers or public officials, but from the nascent National
42. Evidence of both Beveridge and Tawney cited in n. 4 above.
43. Much of the following section is taken from Phillips and Whiteside, Casual Labour, ch. 4.
44. Tonnage entering and leaving Liverpool had doubled every fifteen years between 1815 and
1860; D. Caradog Jones, Social Survey of Merseyside (Liverpool, 1934), pp. 21–22. In 1900, this
was 18.5 million tons p.a.; London handled 30.5 million tons p.a. the same year; E. Rathbone,
Report on Labour at the Liverpool Docks (Liverpool, 1904), p. 21.
45. Ibid. p. 7.
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Union of Dock Labourers who, in the wake of successful strike action,
demanded that only union men be hired at the twice-daily ‘‘call’’.46 The
demand was conceded but swiftly eroded. As recession returned, numbers
at the dock gates rose, demand for labour fell and, with this, union
membership dwindled and union control disappeared. Faced, as Stras-
bourg unionists were, with problems of confining job opportunities to
their members, the NUDL leadership became interested in collaborating
with official policies. Although dubious about whether the ultimate
objective of decasualization could be achieved,47 such collaboration
seemed to open an opportunity to extend union control. Following a
successful dock strike in 1911 and a recovery of trade, collective
negotiations involving the Board of Trade produced the Liverpool dock
scheme, designed to confine port work to regular dockers, thereby raising
commercial efficiency and exterminating the principle cause of pauperism
in the city.48 For the Board of Trade, this offered the opportunity to put
decasualization into practice. For the NUDL, the advent of the scheme
spelt an end to organizational difficulties. For employers, who had lost the
dispute, it appeared to offer the chance of lower hourly wages, if
employment could be rationalized over the long term.
Under organizational principles derived from Alsace-Lorraine, the
object behind the scheme was to increase labour mobility between different
port employers and sections of the port. The twice-daily call at the dock
gates was unchanged. Labour that was not hired went to one of the thirteen
surplus stands, or sub-labour exchanges, which were linked by telephone to
one of six clearing-houses (each supervised by a joint representative
committee) that coordinated employment in each of the six areas into
which the port was divided. A numbered tally identified registered
dockworkers: a joint committee of union and employer representatives
agreed the register, and union membership was compulsory. Registered
dockers lodged their National Insurance cards at one of the clearing-
houses, whence they collected weekly paid wages (with their insurance
contribution deducted). Employers’ contributions were charged in pro-
portion to the number of men hired each week: this supposedly giving them
an incentive to concentrate work in the hands of a limited number of men.49
The scheme was financed by the Board of Trade as both surplus stands and
clearing houses were types of labour exchange50 (and Beveridge was
Director of Labour Exchanges at the time of the scheme’s inauguration).
Machinery that worked in Strasbourg failed to perform in Liverpool.
46. E.L. Taplin, Liverpool Dockers and Seamen, 1870–1890 (Hull, 1974), ch. 4.
47. See NUDL leader Sexton’s evidence to the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, Minutes of
Evidence, VIII; PP, Cmd 5066, 1909, pp. 305–311.
48. R. Williams, First Year’s Working of the Liverpool Docks Scheme (Liverpool, 1914), pp. 5–7.
49. Ibid., pp. 165–172.
50. See correspondence on file LAB 2/170/LE 398/20/1912, NA.
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On the scheme’s introduction, the rank-and-file dockers came out on
unofficial strike.51 A dislike of paying insurance contributions, a convic-
tion that employers would use clearing-house labour to break strikes, and
personal fears of being ‘‘squeezed out’’ by the scheme all provoked trouble.
The NUDL persuaded the men back to work only with some difficulty.52
Thereafter, confrontation was replaced by neglect; both sides of the
industry undermined the scheme by ignoring its terms. Employers found
the delays that resulted from sending to the clearing-houses for extra
labour intolerable and, when required, simply registered unregistered
labour that still hung around the dock gates. Tight schedules meant that
training new recruits with each shipment was unrealistic; gang foremen
preferred to hire men with experience, who knew their work and its
routines. The promotion of labour mobility between sectors, far from
promoting efficiency, caused delay and raised costs. Registered men
therefore avoided the clearing-houses – except to collect their weekly pay.
In the years of relatively full employment that followed 1912, attendance
proved problematic. Most dockers only wanted to work three or four days
per week, to earn a basic subsistence wage: permanent men at the north
end, where union organization was weak, were despised as slaves.53 ‘‘They
have adapted the habits of their lives only too well to the conditions of
their work’’, an enquiry had noted in 1904. ‘‘They are said to prefer a long
spell of almost continuous work by day and night, followed by two or
three days idleness, to regular habits and moderate hours.’’ 54 Such ‘‘regular
habits’’ were not to be acquired overnight.
In consequence, the register expanded uncontrollably, well beyond the
port’s needs. The 1911 Census recorded 25,219 dockworkers in Liverpool;
in 1912, over 30,000 tallies were in circulation. Clearing-house statistics
revealed that, on average, each tally holder received some pay thirty-four
weeks out of fifty-two (albeit for as little as half a day’s work).55 Men
occasionally reverting to the waterfront for work registered alongside
regular dockers. Decasualization failed: in the absence of support from
within the industry, the policy was not implemented because it proved to
be not implementable.
C O N C L U S I O N S
Why did the Alsace-Lorraine system work so well while the Liverpool
scheme failed? One response might focus on the different labour markets
51. See file LAB 2/1483/LE2211/16/1912, NA
52. NUDL, Executive Report for 1911 (printed), pp. 7–8.
53. Sexton to R.C. on the Poor Laws, pp. 304–305.
54. Rathbone, Report on Labour at the Liverpool Docks, pp. 42–43.
55. Beveridge Papers: ‘‘Casual Labour Documents, 1913–24’’; BP III/47/6, British Library of
Political and Economic Science.
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involved. The historiography of dock labour has long emphasized the
exceptional nature of port employment and the peculiarities of the casual
hiring systems it fostered. While such differences might form part of an
explanation, it is easy to exaggerate its significance. The casual nature of
port labour in Liverpool, as elsewhere, disguised the range of employment
to be found there. British social investigators, mesmerized by the problem
of pauperism and its causes, turned their gaze on the very poor, bypassing
skilled workers, the specialist gangs, and comparatively regular men who
earned a reasonable livelihood in what was admittedly a high-risk
occupation. As Tawney emphasized in his evidence to the Poor Law
Commissioners, a large surplus of immobile, unskilled labour, drawn from
all walks of life, lay at the heart of the problem: but this fringe hung around
building sites, markets, warehouses, and gasworks as well as the docks.
As for the difference between regular and casual, there was ‘‘no hard and
fast line between them’’.56 The geographical concentration of dock work
created a focal space within which the problems of casualism were
displayed, but to argue that these were unique to the waterfront is to
misinterpret the nature of unskilled employment in other trades. The
construction sites and building projects in Strasbourg also attracted general
labourers from elsewhere; seasonal employment was considered the main
problem, but then seasonality also affected dock work. In both cities,
employment was expanding steadily in the decades preceding World War
I. However, the establishment of official agencies that succeeded in
organizing Strasbourg’s labour market and in integrating newcomers in
full cooperation with the organized labour movement and local employers
marks out a key difference between the two cities that still requires
explanation.
The core of the answer lies in the fact that apparently identical policies
were actually addressing labour market problems that were viewed in
different ways. In Britain, as indicated above, the creation and perpetua-
tion of pauperism was the principle cause for official concern and its
containment lay at the heart of the reform project. Casual labour
perpetuated underemployment and caused pauperism: therefore casual
labour systems must be eliminated. In Strasbourg, although poverty was
higher than elsewhere in Germany, this was evidently not the case. The
adoption of the Ghent system of unemployment insurance to supplement
the labour exchanges gives us one clue. Subsidies to union unemployment
benefits did nothing for the irregularly employed construction worker,
whose unions did not recruit the unskilled fringe and did not offer such
benefits anyway. Rather such a response to trade-union demands was
designed to win the support of the skilled labour force: the core of the
56. Tawney to R.C. on Poor Laws: questions 96621–96627 and 96728.
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organized labour movement. The careful deployment of union representa-
tion at all levels of local labour market administration makes the same
point. Strasbourgeois strategy, in common with municipal policy in other
German cities, aimed to contain the possible threat of social democracy. In
this instance, the transfer of sovereignty also plays its part; careful
concession to the better organized sectors of the labour market would
create support for a new and essentially foreign regime. In Strasbourg in
particular, the strategy was successful, thanks largely to the highly
democratic nature of municipal government, facilitating links between a
powerful reform party and organized labour.
Other key differences illuminate this analysis. Self evidently, the
administrative structure of the Kaiserreich served Strasbourg well; once
the principles of self-governance were restored, regional and municipal
autonomy combined to foster the creation of new initiatives. Liverpool,
like other British industrial cities, required the authority of Parliament
before any new policy could be put in place; the authority to initiate the
Liverpool Dock Labour Scheme came from a central department of state,
not the local city council. In Alsace-Lorraine, the exchange system formed
only one part of a general policy of labour market organization: a
reforming agenda that also integrated union benefits, education, training,
and poor law authorities within collectively recognized and agreed policy
objectives. In Liverpool, the dock scheme remained isolated. There were
no links with local government, poor law guardians, or education
authorities at either local or national levels. Official supervision rested
with remote civil servants in Whitehall who had no means of legitimating
the scheme they sought to promote.
Further, the issue of compulsion is very different in the two cases. In
Strasbourg, employers undertaking municipal work and/or seeking
apprentices were compelled to use the exchanges; men seeking work
resorted to them as and when required. In Alsace-Lorraine, the
unemployed thus identified themselves: the exchange, partly controlled
by the unions, was a reference point determining how their situation was
to be addressed. In contrast, the Liverpool scheme was built on a
preconceived normative working week and was designed to isolate and
eject those failing to conform to this model. The exchange was a tool to
achieve this goal; it remained under the direction of a professional,
centralized bureaucracy. This imposition of a new type of managerial
discipline unsurprisingly provoked resentment The different administra-
tive locations of apparently similar agencies thus indicate contrasting
perceptions of how economic efficiency was to be reconciled with social
justice – returning us to broader political agendas within which these
labour market initiatives developed.
In both Strasbourg and Liverpool, conflict and compromise between
different agendas are visible and different meanings of ‘‘modernization’’
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are invoked. While holding in common that public intervention was
required to create a modern labour market and to define its privileges, the
rationale underpinning these interventions differed profoundly. How was
prosperity to be promoted? How should a modern labour market be
managed to offer opportunities and create social harmony? Answers to
such questions were not uniform, but reflected different political
assumptions about how collective well being was to be secured and the
role state agencies should play in securing it.
In Alsace-Lorraine, in very simple terms, two different conceptions of
modernity combined. A German agenda of creating an efficient economic
order blended with French republican dedication to principles of
democratic participation in collective decision-making as central to a
modern republican polity. In the first place, official agencies of various
stripes were actively involved with those unable to maintain themselves, at
every level, in order to offer appropriate treatment to different cases. While
distinctions between those who were labour market active and those who
were not were sustained, providing the ‘‘excluded’’ with the means to
integrate created liquidity between different categories. In the second,
democratically elected local authorities (and Alsace-Lorraine was more
democratic than any other part of Germany in this period) integrated
representation of labour and employers at every level of these operations.
In Liverpool, the political pattern was quite different: a local economy
operating on free-market principles confronted a reform programme
rooted in social scientific precepts. Here, laissez-faire orthodoxies had
traditionally demanded that those poor from want of work should take
care of themselves; punitive poor laws had long enforced this message. The
introduction of normative standardization based on expertise derived from
the disciplines of statistics and economics, involving scientifically
sustained systems of classification that presaged different typologies of
social treatment, came as something of a cultural shock. This prescriptive
technical world of social ordering denies that the independent economic
actor is capable, through the free exercise of personal choice, of securing
his future. The battle between these different social visions marginalized
the impact of labour exchanges on the distribution of work. It has
dominated British politics ever since.
This is evident in the subsequent history of organizing the dock labour
market in Britain. The objections raised to the Liverpool Dock Scheme
before World War I offer, in microcosm, the general problems sub-
sequently encountered by British authorities in enforcing dock de-
casualization. The principles of the registration scheme, attached to the
carrot of a basic maintenance wage, formed the foundation stone of later
schemes, introduced in the face of strike action throughout the twentieth
century. The idea was only finally abandoned following the election of
Mrs Thatcher, when dock labour decasualization was scrapped in the name
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of market de-regulation. Moreover, the early reception afforded to the
system of clearing-houses and surplus stands on the Liverpool waterfront
reflected the wider, more general attitude of British employers and unions
towards the introduction of labour exchanges – later renamed employ-
ment exchanges, later still Job Centres. None have ever exercised an
important influence on the distribution of work. Throughout the
twentieth century, such official agencies in Britain have remained external
to processes of labour market organization, whereas in continental
European economies, the state has played a more central role in shaping
their operation.
This is not to argue that continental European strategies have been
identical: this is far from the case. In Strasbourg, in contrast to Liverpool,
public intervention to create a social order and to promote collective
wellbeing appears to have been less contentious. When carrying the
history of Strasbourg forward, however, we can note how, on the
restoration of French sovereignty in 1918, the labour-exchange network
in Alsace-Lorraine disappeared. As noted above, the promotion of labour
mobility as a solution to unemployment was absent in France, as it posed a
threat to fragile urban labour relations following a period of revolutionary
political upheaval. The very late establishment of a national French
network of placement agencies (created in 1967) illustrates this profound
difference with German tradition.
While their labour exchanges vanished, however, the working popu-
lation of Alsace-Lorraine proved fierce defenders of the privileges
acquired under the Bismarckean social insurance laws. Their position
forced a reconsideration of French political attitudes to social insurance.
Following prolonged debate, the example set by Alsace-Lorraine stimu-
lated the introduction of France’s first social insurance schemes after 1928.
Again this does not point to growing continental homogeneity: French
initiatives involved family allowances, health, and pension insurance. In
Germany, a national scheme of unemployment insurance was introduced
in 1927; in France, such a scheme was not put in place until 1958 – and then
under a joint agreement negotiated by employers and unions that excluded
the state. The emergence of a national strategy to address a national labour
market in France was initiated during the Slump years but essentially post-
dated World War II.
To carry the story forward after 1918, however, is to enter a different
political world. During the interwar years, the unemployment debate
shifted ground.57 The advent of industrial recession caused the irregular
worker, who had commanded centre stage in earlier years, to give place to
the long-term unemployed as the main object of public debate. This
57. For Britain, see J. Gillespie and N. Whiteside, ‘‘Deconstructing Unemployment’’, Economic
History Review, 44 (1991), pp. 665–682.
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change of policy focus should not be taken as evidence of the
disappearance of earlier practices. Nor should we assume that, before
1914, long-term unemployment did not exist: its victims remained at
the fringes of political consideration. As is widely acknowledged, the
consequences of the Slump years revolutionized the role of the state in
terms of its responsibilities for sustaining full employment, but again
uniform vocabularies describing new policy instruments disguised very
different agendas and varied points of acceptable state intervention.
In microcosm, the historical comparison presented above has analysed
why, in an earlier era, similar solutions to the issue of labour market
organization performed differently in different contexts. The main focus
has been on the role that official agencies were expected to play in tackling
the unemployment question. Different conventions of public action
determined the feasibility of a specific policy. While the objectives in
Liverpool and Strasbourg were similar, the acceptability of public
intervention rested on very different foundations. Agendas of public
action draw their legitimacy from different collective assumptions about
the proper role of government in securing the public good: themselves the
product of earlier historical events that have not been alluded to here. The
role official agencies should play reflects common perceptions of how
economic efficiency and social justice can be secured: through the
individual exercise of personal liberty, through the maintenance of public
order, through the exercise of collective democratic deliberation. Different
situations and governing conventions require different compromises
between these agendas and shape different spheres of public action. The
lens through which social and political issues are viewed, interpreted and
tackled reflects the nature of that public sphere; this determines the
viability of specific policy solutions. Such a dimension on comparative
policy analysis cannot be captured by social sciences that address the issue
through the measurement of outcomes alone, thereby assuming that the
public sphere is a common space. Thanks to their preoccupation with
change, historians are uniquely placed to observe the different points at
which different states can intervene to secure their policy goals, offering a
significant dimension on comparative analyses that is frequently forgotten
or ignored.
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